

# Corruption Risk Assessment in the Management & Distribution of Social Protection Initiatives & Humanitarian Aid in Zimbabwe

A Case Study of Cyclone Idai & The Cholera Response (Chimanimani & Harare)



**TRANSPARENCY  
INTERNATIONAL  
ZIMBABWE**  
the coalition against corruption

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report, including allegations. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2020. Nevertheless, Transparency International Zimbabwe cannot guarantee the accuracy and the completeness of the contents. Nor can Transparency International Zimbabwe accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purpose or in other contents. Contributions to the **Corruption Risk Assessment in the Management and Distribution of Social Protection Initiative and Humanitarian Aid in Zimbabwe** by authors external to Transparency International Zimbabwe do not necessarily reflect the views of Transparency International Zimbabwe or its national chapter.

ISBN 978-1-77929-944-4

CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT  
AND DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION INITIATIVES  
AND HUMANITARIAN AID IN ZIMBABWE  
A 2019 publication by Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z)  
96 Central Avenue,  
Harare  
[www.tizim.org](http://www.tizim.org)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission from the publishers.

Layout & Design: Wilford Kevin Alimanzi

## Acknowledgements

Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) is greatly indebted to its funding partners who include but are not limited to the Embassy of Sweden in Zimbabwe, for their technical and financial support. Without this support, this research would not have been possible. TI Z would also like to acknowledge the meticulous work exhibited by Práticas Consulting Group during the compilation of this report. They demonstrated their support for efforts aimed at promoting transparency, accountability and integrity in the management and distribution of social protection initiatives and humanitarian aid in Zimbabwe.

Further, TI Z would like to extend its appreciation to the various stakeholders who contributed to the data gathering processes through sharing of information and lived experiences. The community leaders, the men, women and the youth from Budiro, Glenview (Harare) and Chimanimani - this study would not have been a success without your direct participation and input. TI Z is greatly indebted. Lastly, TI Z would like to express its gratitude to the entire TI Z team- special mention goes to Samuel Jack Matikiti and Tashinga Vivian Zamba who worked with the consultant and the communities involved to make this study a success.

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Acronyms	iv
Summary of Findings	v
Executive Summary	viii
1.0 Introduction and Background	01
2.0 Purpose and Scope of the Study	02
2.1 Purpose of the Study	02
2.2 Scope of the Study	02
2.3 Objective of the Study	02
2.4 The Research Questions	02
2.5 Limitations and Challenges	03
2.6 Delimitation	03
3.0 Literature Review	04
3.1 Conceptualising Corruption Risk, Vulnerabilities and Impact	04
3.1.1 Corruption	04
3.1.2 Corruption Risk	04
3.1.3 Corruption Risk Assessment	04
3.1.4 Humanitarian Aid	04
3.1.5 Anti-Corruption Frameworks for Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid	04
3.1.6 Anti-Corruption Policies and Guidelines	05
3.1.7 Corruption in Program Support Functions	05
3.1.8 Corruption in Program Cycle	05
3.1.9 Transparency & Accountability	06
3.1.10 Disability Inclusion	06
4.0 Methodology	07
4.1 Primary Data Collection	07
4.1.1 Qualitative Data Collection	07
4.1.1.1 Consultative Workshop	07
4.1.1.2 Semi – Structured Household Interviews	07
4.1.1.3 Key Informant Interviews	07
4.1.1.4 Focus Group Discussions	07
4.1.1.5 Score Card Matrix	08
4.1.1.6 Mapping Tool	08

# Table of Contents

4.2	<a href="#">Secondary Data</a>	09
5.0	<a href="#">Research Findings</a>	10
5.1	<a href="#">Introduction</a>	10
5.2	<a href="#">Humanitarian Aid Recipients Perception About Corruption</a>	10
5.3	<a href="#">Mapping Of Corruption Risks, Vulnerabilities and Impact</a>	10
5.3.1	<a href="#">Collusion in Aid Management</a>	11
5.3.2	<a href="#">Accountability Lapses</a>	12
5.3.3	<a href="#">Limited Access to Information</a>	13
5.3.4	<a href="#">Clientelism in Aid Management</a>	14
5.3.5	<a href="#">Political Corruption</a>	16
5.3.6	<a href="#">Non- Transparent Procurement Processes</a>	16
5.3.7	<a href="#">Code of Conduct Violations</a>	18
5.3.8	<a href="#">Conflict of Interests</a>	20
5.3.9	<a href="#">Ethics Breeches in Aid Management</a>	20
5.3.10	<a href="#">None Existence of Whistleblowing Opportunities</a>	21
6.0	<a href="#">Impact of Corruption on the Primary Aid Recipients</a>	22
6.1	<a href="#">Reinforcing Latent Political Tension</a>	22
6.2	<a href="#">Women Disproportionately Disadvantaged (Sexual Exploitation and Gender Based Violence)</a>	23
6.3	<a href="#">Increased Protection &amp; Safe Guarding Risks</a>	24
6.4	<a href="#">Exclusion Of Persons With Disabilities</a>	25
7.0	<a href="#">Recommendations</a>	26
8.0	<a href="#">Conclusion</a>	27
	<a href="#">References</a>	28

## Acronyms

CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CRA	Corruption Risk Assessment
CRVAT	Corruption Risks and Vulnerability Assessment Tool
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
MACRA	Mining Awards Corruption Risk Assessment Tool
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PLWD	People Living With Disabilities
PYD	Platform for Youth Development
SSHIs	Semi Structured Household Interviews
TI	Transparency International
TI Z	Transparency International Zimbabwe
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ZCC	Zimbabwe Council of Churches

## Summary of Findings

**Collusion** was evident in both responses, the irregularities, uncoordinated registrations, double registrations and unclear mechanism created local cartels and opened opportunities for gross collusion.

Access to key facts and data which is critical in aid management was not facilitated. The communities especially the primary aid recipients were deprived of critical facts and data around the aid and social initiatives.

**Clientism** was observed especially in the Cyclone Idai where communities strongly assert that the uniformed forces used aid to gain sexual favours (sextortion). Clientism was also evident though to a lesser extent in Harare during the Cholera response where nurses would solicit for favours from cholera victim's relatives who needed hospitalisation.

An effective Complainants and Response mechanism is premised on information and knowledge of expected standards and processes. The primary beneficiaries of aid in both responses were never appraised of the accountability standards, ethics and any other code of conduct related information. The aid recipients were not empowered to voice out their complaints.

**Conflict of interests** characterised the processes, where personalities were registering, verifying and distributing aid – they were managing the whole value chain without checks and balances.

**Political corruption** was observed in both responses. There was some level of manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure at local level. Procurement processes are a critical element in the aid value chain management. Hence benefiting community was never in the picture and it became the business of intervening agencies and other secondary actors.

**Whistle-blowing** which can assist in disclosure of irregularities was not promoted and communities were not empowered to utilise this effective tool.

The corruption risks and vulnerabilities had a negative impact on the aid recipients and their communities. The impact can be summed up as – reinforcement of existing political tensions, women disproportionately disadvantaged, gender and sexual abuse and violence increased, augmented child protection risks and vulnerabilities and negative economic effect on local economy.

UNCATEGORISED

## Cyclone aid looters to face the music

10 MAR 2019 - 09:02



<https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/cyclone-aid-looters-to-face-the-music>

### Lincoln Towindo in Chikomba

Government will decisively deal with irresponsible individuals who abuse or distribute aid along partisan lines, Vice President Dr Constantino Chiwenga has said.

The Vice President said this yesterday in Chikomba at the handover of

Cde Chiwenga also said the President will lead a delegation of all political leaders to Chimanimani to assess the

NATIONAL

## Ministry official nabbed over Idai donations

08 APR 2019 - 09:02 2 COMMENTS 1 IMAGE



### From Luthando Mapepa and Ray Bunde in CHIPINGE

A deputy director in the Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development on Saturday appeared before a Chipinge magistrate facing charges of stealing Cyclone Idai donations worth \$3 000.

The accused, Christine Chideme (63), of Southerton, Harare, appeared before resident magistrate Mr Farai Gwitima, who denied her bail and remanded the matter to tomorrow for trial.

She pleaded not guilty.

Prosecuting, Mr Themba Dhliwayo told the court that on April 3 at around 7pm, Chideme, who was driving a Toyota Landcruiser (WAG-CD23), was stopped by Terrence Majonga, a soldier, while she was coming from Silver Stream Cyclone Idai command centre, between Chipinge and Chimanimani.

<https://www.herald.co.zw/ministry-official-nabbed-over-idai-donations/>



News > Zim\$ depreciates 27.28% as Reuters goes live

News / National

## Energy Mutodi speaks on Cyclone Idai looters

<https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-160214.html>

Deputy Government Spokesperson Energy Mutodi has condemned the high ranking government officials who are being investigated over looting relief aid which was meant for Cyclone Idai victims.

Said Mutodi, "Government officials and politicians accused of looting Cyclone Idai donations are a disgrace and an embarrassment to the nation. Stern measures have been taken to bring these self-centred individuals to book and some are already being prosecuted."

Last month Alpha Media Holding Council, Trevor Ncube raised concerns over politicians.

"The distribution of Cyclone Idai relief aid is a disgrace. The heartless and corrupt Zanu-PF leadership has looted the aid," Ncube said.

The Southern Africa group, the Africa Business Council, has called for the investigation of looting and pillaging in the affected provinces.

"News of looting and partisan distribution of aid is disheartening but a sign of wickedness."

REGISTER LOGIN

NEWS POLITICS CORONAVIRUS SPORT TRNSALIVE LIFESTYLE BUSINESS MOTORING MULTIMEDIA TIME'S SELECT

TSHISALIVE

## Zim artist slams Cyclone Idai aid: 'The donations don't reach the affected people'

27 March 2019 - 12:45  
BY CEBELIHE BHENGU



Zimbabwean reggae musician Buffalo Souljah has taken to Instagram to express his concern around the distribution of aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai.

The cyclone ripped through Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi earlier this month, triggering floods that left hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.

Aid has been pouring into the assisted areas since the tragedy but Zimbabwean media, including [Bulawayo 24](#) and [News Day](#) reported that it is not reaching the intended destination.

Instead they claim that Zimbabwe's ruling party, Zanu-PF has looted the donations meant to help people who have been affected by the disaster.

According to [News Day](#), Zanu-PF branded vehicles were seen driving away with food items meant to aid those affected. The report further claimed that the party's ward councillors took charge of the distribution of food so they could allegedly prioritise Zanu-PF followers in their areas.

<https://www.timeslive.co.za/tshisa-live/tshisa-live/2019-03-27-zim-artist-slams-cyclone-idai-aid-the-donations-dont-reach-the-affected-people/>



Corruption in Zimbabwe has cut across the length and breadth of critical sectors to the Zimbabwean political economy. The country continues to score negatively on corruption indices such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In 2019, Zimbabwe was ranked number 158 out of 180 countries assessed on the CPI with a low CPI score of 24. This low CPI score is indicative of high level of perceived corruption in the public sector. The cholera epidemic of 2018 and the Cyclone Idai national disaster of 2019 exposed the ugly face of corruption in humanitarian aid and social protection initiatives distribution as there were numerous media reports on corruption in aid management. Driven by the need to advance solutions for the safeguarding of humanitarian aid and social initiatives distribution against corruption, Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) conducted a Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) focusing the case studies of Cyclone Idai and the 2018 Cholera epidemic.

A CRA is a diagnostic research tool which identifies and exposes corruption gaps and vulnerabilities with a system. The tool also assess the likelihood of the corruption risks to manifest and their potential impact. TI Z thus used this tool to identify corruption risks and gaps in the management of humanitarian aid and social protection initiatives. The main objective behind the study was that of using this empirical evidence to craft relevant interventions that seek to address the identified risks and vulnerabilities which help to enhance transparency and accountability in the implementation of humanitarian operations at institutional, policy and operational levels. For us as TI Z, the value of the information we present in this study should be measured against its ability to influence the development of collective actions and safeguards to protect humanitarian aid and social protection initiatives from the inherent risk of corruption as well as the ability of this study to influence further studies on this subject. As the CRA analyses structural and process oriented issues, the data generated and presented in this paper is largely qualitative.

Overall the CRA revealed that the food assistance programming value chain, from resource allocation, to procurement and shipment, to local warehousing and secondary transportation, to targeting, registration and distribution, and post-distribution dynamics, are open to significant risks of diversion and corruption. This has been due to lack of clearly defined frameworks, platforms and systems that guide and regulate management of food aid. In both case studies, the CRA revealed that there are wide opportunities for corruption ranging from political influence, collusion and conflict of interests in the management and distribution of aid. It was further found that those in less need or not in need of aid benefited at the expense of the vulnerable affected citizens. We did find that one's political affiliation and political networks was a key determinant to access aid. In the case of Cyclone Idai it was observed that the humanitarian aid distribution had exposed women to gendered forms of corruption manifesting largely through sextortion. From the

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) it emerged that uniformed forces involved in the distribution of aid were leveraging on aid to demand for sex and sexual favours from the vulnerable women in Chimanimani. The CRA also revealed that there were weak anti-corruption safeguards in aid and social protection initiatives distribution . It was observed that affected communities were deprived of access to crucial empowering information. This was further compounded by the lack of whistle-blowing mechanisms and corruption reporting platforms allowing communities to expose and report corruption. Against this backdrop, the study makes a number of recommendations chief among them include:

- Transparent beneficiary registration and full public disclosure to information
- The need to empower multiple stakeholder to monitor aid management
- The need to come up with online and virtual tracking systems for aid
- Create anti-corruption task teams or committees. Beneficiaries of aid or social initiatives must be part of these teams.
- Train all stakeholders in aid management on anti-corruption safe guards in aid and social initiatives distributions
- Create platforms allowing reporting of corruption in aid management





**TRANSPARENCY  
INTERNATIONAL  
ZIMBABWE**

the coalition against corruption

## **Abuse of Public Office**

the commission of unlawful act done  
in an official capacity which  
affects the performance  
of official duties

## **Extortion**

Act of utilising, either directly or  
indirectly, one's access to a position of  
power \or knowledge to demand  
unmerited cooperation or  
compensation as a  
result of coercive threats.

## **Patronage**

Form of favouritism in which a  
person is selected, regardless of  
qualifications or entitlement,  
for a job or government benefit  
because of affiliations or  
connections.

# **CORRUPTION**

Abuse of  
entrusted power for  
private gain

## **Petty Corruption**

Everyday abuse of entrusted power  
by public officials in their interactions  
with ordinary citizens, who often  
are trying to access basic goods or  
services in places like hospitals,  
schools, police departments  
and other agencies.

## **Grand Corruption**

The abuse of high-level power that  
benefits the few at the expense of the  
many, and causes serious and  
widespread harm to individuals  
and society.  
It often goes unpunished

## **Political Corruption**

Manipulation of policies, institutions  
and rules of procedure in the  
allocation of resources and financing  
by political decision makers,  
who abuse their position to  
sustain their power,  
status and wealth.



She deserves a  
corruption free  
Zimbabwe



## 1.0 Introduction and Background



Social protection is the set of public actions that address the deprivation and vulnerabilities of the poorest, and the need of the currently non-poor for security in the face of shocks and the particular demands of different stages of the life cycle (Clare O'Brien 2018). Humanitarian aid on the other hand is a generic term used to describe the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. It involves material or logistical assistance given to assist those affected by natural catastrophes, human conflict or other forms of severe political, economic or social breakdowns. When resources are transferred to households to enable them to meet basic needs, the tools used for humanitarian assistance are often similar to those used in social protection initiatives. More often than not the same frameworks, platforms and systems are utilized in such programmes.

However, while these initiatives are noble, they are not immune from corrupt abuse.<sup>1</sup> Commonly the countries in which the majority of humanitarian aid is delivered already suffer from high levels of corruption prior to an emergency (Maxwell 2008). Food assistance programming, from resource allocation, to procurement and shipment, to local warehousing and secondary transportation, to targeting, registration and distribution, and post-distribution dynamics, are open to significant risks of diversion and corruption.<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding the high likelihood of corruption in social protection

initiatives and humanitarian aid distribution and its impact, corruption in those areas remains an under researched issue in Zimbabwe.<sup>3</sup> In the Zimbabwean context numerous reported cases of corruption in the distribution of humanitarian aid and social protection initiatives exist. Examples of corruption in the humanitarian aid were brought to the fore during the cholera crisis of 2018 and the Cyclone Idai disaster of 2019 (*Bulawayo24 News 9 April 2019*). It is against this backdrop that TI Z undertook a Corruption Risk Assessment in the management and distribution of Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid in Zimbabwe with the aim of identifying corruption risks and vulnerabilities thereof and proposing recommendations to strengthen the management and distribution of social protection initiatives and humanitarian aid in Zimbabwe..



Image Source: Privilege Musvanhiri

1. Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance, 2008 7 ibid
2. Maxwell et al 2011
3. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/evidence-corruption-and-humanitarian-aid>



### 2.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to understand the corruption risks and vulnerabilities in the management of social protection initiatives and humanitarian aid in Zimbabwe and the impact thereof on the vulnerable groups. It aimed at identifying and describing the characteristics of the Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses systems, their shortcomings, the strengths, the political, economic and social factors which were inherent and enabled or sustained corruption.

### 2.2 Scope of the Study

The assessment was a Case Study focusing on the Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses for Chimanimani and Harare (Budiro and Glen View) respectively. The case study was eclectic, with elements of a retrospective and inductive approach. Retrospective case studies examine a small number of past cases related to the subject of study while an inductive study approach build up from observations, identification of patterns and subsequently coming up with theories or conclusions.<sup>4</sup> It is important to reiterate that case studies are not designed for large group studies or statistical analysis. The assessment was a primary research study and qualitative in its approach. The theoretical base for the sample size for the qualitative values was influenced by Coenen et al (2012) assertion on saturation for analysis. The argument is that as few as 3 groups are likely to reveal 90% of important themes. In this context the assessment which was a case study as

already alluded to earlier had a sample size of 490 respondents (male/females).

### 2.3 Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study was to identify and map corruption risks and vulnerabilities in the management of Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid in Zimbabwe – a Case Study of Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses for Chimanimani and Harare respectively.

### 2.4 The Research Questions

- **What were the corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact observed during Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses?** - (Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid value chain and management process - from the design of the process, the practice and the context)
- **What is the context in which the process took place?** - the political, economic, social, legal and technological factors?
- **What was the likelihood and impact of resulting corruption risk?** - explore and analyse the effectiveness of corruption controls, transparency and accountability mechanisms among the different stakeholders?

4. Burney (2008:6)

## 2.5 Limitations and Challenges

Corruption risk assessments do not need to be too resource intensive. In contrast with tools which aim at establishing the incidence, scope and forms of corruption, much of the data required for risk assessments can be collected from existing sources although some additional primary sources may be needed for the specific system/process under analysis.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, it may be that some data is difficult for 'outsiders' to access, for example it may be particularly difficult for a civil society organisation to get reliable information on the extent to which regulations are enforced within a government institution.

Using the informed opinions of those closely involved in the process under analysis can serve as a useful proxy for such data. It is in this context that the case study was limited and focused on the primary beneficiaries of the Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses.

The case study had challenges in getting responses from secondary stakeholders. These could have triangulated the collected data and the identified corruption vulnerabilities, risks and impact. The study was thus limited and was primarily informed by the primary stakeholders.

## 2.6 Delimitation

The delimitations of this Case Study sought to narrow the scope of the study. The study was a Case Study focusing on two cases – the Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses in Zimbabwe. The study had 5 sites namely Budiriro and Glenview in Harare, Ngangu,

Rusitu and Machongwe in Chimanimani. The study focused on the primary participants of the responses – the aid recipients to be specific and community members resident in the affected areas at time of the responses. The study also focused on assessing corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact on the primary respondents. The study was mostly qualitative, and its sample size was thus determined based on qualitative research guidelines.



Image Source: Privilege Musvanhiri

5. Transparency International guidelines.



### 3.1 Conceptualising Corruption Risks, Vulnerabilities and Impact

#### 3.1.1 Corruption

Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It asserts that corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.

#### 3.1.2 Corruption Risk

Corruption risk is a phenomena which is understood as a factor of the level of transparency and level of fairness in a process. Transparency International posits that corruption risk is understood as the difference between the actual and ideal system.

#### 3.1.3 Corruption Risk Assessment

The Transparency International Gateway Corruption Assessment Toolbox defines Corruption risk assessment as a (diagnostic) tool which seeks to identify weaknesses within a system which may present opportunities for corruption to occur. It differs from many other corruption assessment tools in that it focuses on the potential for - rather than the perception, existence or extent of corruption. At its core a risk assessment tends to involve some degree of evaluation of the likelihood of corruption occurring and/or the impact it would have should it occur. Hart defines

Corruption Risk Assessment as an effort at describing the characteristics of a given context, systems shortcomings (and strengths) and political, economic and social factors that enable and sustain corruption.<sup>6</sup>

The study was eclectic in its approach and included tenets from both definitions highlighted above.

#### 3.1.4 Humanitarian Aid

The New World Encyclopaedia (2018) defines Humanitarian Aid as material or logistical assistance (or aid provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to an event or series of events which represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security, or well being of a large number of people. These events may be natural—weather or health related such as floods, earthquakes, famines, epidemics or man-made, such as armed conflicts.

#### 3.1.5 Anti-Corruption Frameworks for Social Protection Initiatives & Humanitarian Aid

The rights-based approach to humanitarian aid and social initiatives argue that any assistance or response should be inclusive. Key players such as UNICEF(2019) assert their commitment to inclusive social protection that is responsive to the needs of all children and sensitive to particular characteristics and

6. Hart (2019:1) U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.



identities which can increase the risk of exclusion, including gender, disability status, ethnicity, HIV status, and geographic location.

UNICEF further asserts that in any response the national systems and leadership should assume the coordination of any efforts.

The international humanitarian architecture principles as propounded by Hees and Debere (2016).<sup>7</sup> speak of humanity and impartiality. Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life, health and ensure respect for human beings and neutrality. Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions, independence, humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold in relation to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (GSDRC).

### **3.1.6 Anti-Corruption Policies & Guidelines**

The need for a strategic approach to addressing corruption risks is high and pertinent. The strategic approach facilitates organisational context that promotes transparency, integrity and accountability – for example, by integrating analysis of corruption risks and the political environment into emergency preparedness. This holistic approach involves viewing corruption mitigation as

central to the quality and management of humanitarian operations to be mainstreamed into agencies' strategic agendas rather than considered a marginal question.

### **3.1.7 Corruption in Program Support Functions**

Research indicates that much corruption occurs within programme support functions (Transparency International, 2010). It is thus recommended that agencies strengthen systems against corruption at that level. It is also prudent for agencies to seek to address specific corruption risks faced in supply chain management (procurement, transport and asset management), human resources (HR) and finance.

### **3.1.8 Corruption in Program Cycle**

It is argued that even if an agency has strong anti-corruption policies in place and rigorous systems to prevent corruption in programme support functions, vigilance is still essential on the ground, where emergency humanitarian assistance is delivered (Transparency International, 2010). Programme activities may be distorted by cronyism, bias or intimidation, or for political, social or corporate gain. These corrupt practices may not be detected by internal controls such as audits.

7. Pocket Guide by Roslyn Hees and Stephanie Debere with the assistance of Larissa Schuurman and adopted by a wide range of international humanitarian aid players such as Action Aid, World Vision, Care International, Islamic Aid, Lutheran World Foundation, Save the Children, and CRS.

### 3.9 Transparency & Accountability

Transparency and accountability are considered benchmarks that promote excellence in humanitarian operations. Transparency involves opening up procedures and programs to all stakeholders, providing timely, accessible information about operations for their assessment. It is indispensable for the effective monitoring of financial flows and programme implementation needed to prevent corruption. Observations at a global level indicate that agencies often focus on upward accountability to donors or boards, but it is accountability and transparency to beneficiaries that most enhances programme quality. Affected communities should be informed of their rights and entitlements and be involved in assessment, targeting and monitoring. Exposure to corruption falls as community involvement in programs rises as stated by Hees and Debere (2016).

### 3.10 Disability Inclusion

It is important to reiterate that the rights and needs of people with disabilities in disasters are increasingly being addressed. This has been observed through adoption of policies, standards and guidelines which seek to promote meaningful inclusion of persons living with disabilities in disaster response and disaster risk reduction. It is however critical to mention that much more needs to be done to remove the barriers to such inclusion in disaster risk reduction and response. Efforts in both the Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses did not implicitly and explicitly intend to be disability inclusive. John Twigg et al (2018).<sup>8</sup> assert that disability advocates and organisations that focus on people living with disabilities can play a significant role in disaster policy, planning and interventions. However formal disaster response agencies tend to have limited interaction or collaboration with them. This observation was manifest for both the two responses as there was no intentional mobilisation of Disability Persons Organisations and they were generally absent from the intervention value chain.



8. Disability inclusion and disaster risk reduction Overcoming barriers to progress - John Twigg, Maria Kett and Emma Lovell – July 2018

Image Source: Bulawayo24 News



### 4.1 Primary Data Collection

#### 4.1.1 Qualitative Data Collection

Qualitative data was generated using a variety of participatory methods. These were Key Informant interviews (KIs), Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Semi Structured Household Interviews (SSHIs) and a Consultative Workshop. Each of these is discussed in detail below.

##### 4.1.1.1 Consultative Workshop

A total of 55(M-34:F-21) stakeholders participated in the consultative workshop. The consultative workshop's purpose was to map and define the Social Protection and Humanitarian Aid value chain management and processes in Zimbabwe in particular cases of Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses. The workshop provided a framework for all the critical steps in the Corruption Risk Assessment.

##### 4.1.1.2 Semi – Structured Household Interviews

A total of 50 SSHIs were conducted with a total of 137 (M-54:F-83) respondents participating. The interviews were guided by a framework of themes. The guide had a set of thematic questions to anchor the interviews while the interviewer allowed new "ideas" around corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact to allow for rich data. The semi structured interviews allowed for participation of more than one household member and not more than 3 persons. This provided rich data and triangulation of perceptions and

observations by the various members at household level.

##### 4.1.1.3 Key Informant Interviews

A total of 32(M-20:F-12) KIs were conducted. The interviews were anchored by a detailed KIs guide which had accompanying prompts to ensure probing was comprehensive. The interviews targeted different stakeholders in the Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid value chain. The Key Informants were people who were directly involved in the two responses. Both primary (aid recipients) and secondary participants were targeted as key informant respondents.

##### 4.1.1.4 Focus Group Discussions

A total of 10 FGDs with a total of 156 (M-71:F-85) respondents were conducted. Six of the FGDs targeted Cyclone Idai Response participants while the other 4 targeted the Cholera Responses participants. The FGDs respondents were made of a mix of both recipients and non-recipients of aid and social initiatives. The FGDs triangulated data around corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact in the context of Social Protection and Humanitarian Aid value chain and processes. The discussions were anchored on a guide based on thematic key questions. The discussion guide was accompanied by a list of prompts which ensured that there was adequate probing. The FGD triangulated the other data collection techniques.

### 4.1.1.5 Score Card Matrix

A total of 110 (M-50:F-60) respondents rated corruption risks using a score card matrix. The score card matrix had a set of 11 thematic questions with responses on a Likert scale. The score card matrix allowed the respondents to individually rate for each of the thematic questions. All the score card respondents became the FGD respondents and this allowed for triangulation of the ratings.

### 4.1.1.6 Mapping Tool

The data collection process facilitated a mapping exercise for all the 10 FGDs conducted. The 79 FGD respondents participated in the practical exercise of mapping corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact. The mapping exercise used the adapted MACRA tool,<sup>9</sup> which for the purposes of the case study was called the Corruption Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Tool (CRVAT). The tool allowed the respondents to appreciate the scope of the corruption risk assessment, map the social protection and humanitarian aid management chain, identify the corruption vulnerabilities to corruption in the process and practice, analysing the processes and contextual factors and evidence about the occurrence of the risks.



*(Green represent corruption free behaviours and actions; orange indicates corruption)*

9. Transparency International - The Mining Awards Corruption Risk Assessment (MACRA) Tool.

## 4.2 Secondary Data

Secondary data collection included an analysis of various documents and guiding standards around management of Social Protection Initiatives and Humanitarian Aid. The study reviewed other relevant records at targeted stakeholders to enhance TI Z's understanding of the context. The study reviewed various secondary literature such as reports, case studies and similar risk assessment reports among other documents. Through the secondary data an attempt was made to further qualify the risks, vulnerabilities, and impact of corruption in the case study. Corruption Risk Assessment.



## 5.0 Research Findings

### 5.1 Introduction

This section is a presentation of the findings of the study. The presentation in this section is structured around the research questions that guided the study – and illustrated according to the humanitarian aid management value chain as described by the primary recipients of the aid. Feedback from the Consultative Workshop also informed the study framework.

### 5.2 Humanitarian Aid Recipients Perception About Corruption

Across the five study sites there was a sound understanding of corruption. A total of 90% of the FGD respondents rated highly the communities' understanding of corruption. Most of the community members could “identify” corruption if it happened according to the score card ratings. All the Key Informants interviewed during the study had a sound understanding of corruption while the FGDs and SSHIs also revealed sound appreciation of the notion of corruption. The study made a critical assumption that if respondents have a sound understanding of corruption as a phenomena then they are most likely to perceive the corruption risks, vulnerabilities and its impact on their constituencies.

“

Corruption in this context refers to the lack of transparency and accountability in the management and distribution of aid”  
*Adult male FGD respondent at Ngangu, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”




### 5.3 Mapping of Corruption Risks, Vulnerabilities and Impact

An exploration of the Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses value chain from needs assessment to distribution revealed corruption risks, vulnerabilities and the impact was also ascertained. The findings revealed levels of:

1. collusion
2. accountability vulnerabilities
3. limited access to information
4. clientelism
5. unclear or unspecified code of conduct
6. inherent conflict of interest
7. inherent breach of ethics
8. political corruption
9. procurement corruption.

## Illustration of findings on corruption risk, vulnerabilities and impact (mapping)



### 5.3.1 Collusion in Aid Management

Collusion is defined by Transparency International as a secret agreement between parties, in the public and/or private sector, to conspire to commit actions aimed to deceive or commit fraud with the objective of illicit financial gain. The parties involved often are referred to as 'cartels'. The study observed that there were many incidences where collusion was observable in Cyclone Idai (Chimanimani) and Chorea pandemic (Harare).

A total of 94% of the score card ratings asserted that corruption was high in both responses. The corruption observed could have been outright collusion or mere unethical corrupt behaviours that mimicked collusion.

“

We would hear that quality blankets were donated but we only received poor grade blankets also known as zvidonki (cheap) blankets. We would also hear that food stuffs were at the warehouse, but we would be given expired food. The good quality goods will be sold. People made money through our suffering.

*Female Key Informant from Ngangu area of Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”

“

Quality soap was exchanged for the back door locally manufactured cheap type. The quality soap which was procured and delivered was scandalously swapped and sold in the parallel market.

*Female FGD respondent from Budiro Area 1, Harare, Zimbabwe.*

”

There was gross disregard of aid management standards. Humanitarian aid is expected to be managed transparently and in accordance of the “Do no harm” principles. Processes have to ensure it does not feed into community conflicts. This can be facilitated by robust processes and procedures. Sound documentation and transparency with the information are critical in such endeavours. It would be expected that those that brought in aid would share information on the quantities, selection criteria and management of damaged goods or leftovers among other things. The Chimanimani primary respondents stated that some stakeholders would bring and “dump” aid and this created fertile ground for corruption and collusion to be specific.

“

The challenge is that some implementers would just drop the aid, leave it to the management team which in most instances comprised of locals who would then withhold the aid for no apparent reason and connive to swop for cheaper items. The challenge is that even if warnings to desist from such practices were issued, the people managing the aid would defy those warnings."

*Semi structured Household Interview respondents at a household at Risuti Valley, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”

### 5.3.2 Accountability Lapses

Transparency International defines accountability as the concept that individuals, agencies and organisations (public, private and civil society) are held responsible for reporting their activities and executing their powers properly. It also includes the responsibility for money or other entrusted property.

At all the study sites, feedback indicated that there was gross disregard of accountability standards. A total of 61% of the score card ratings posited that aid managers and



stakeholders had disregard of accountability expectations. In both the Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses it can be argued that stakeholders who included government officials and representatives, companies and civil society organisations did not take intentional and formalized actions to share their activities. The communities were not fully appraised of what was happening. This created "power silos" which subsequently increased corruption risks and vulnerabilities. The "power silos" were also fickle and mutated constantly and this increased speculation and suspicion among the aid recipients.

“

You would hear that the distribution of buckets and soap is happening right now in your street, you rush there and you are told they have gone, or your name is not on the register"

*Adult female from Glenview Area 2, Harare, Zimbabwe.*

”

It was established that some stakeholders were not accountable to communities whilst some actually defied the systems communities put in place to manage the aid. As few as 14% of the score card ratings were positive about the mechanisms put in place by the secondary stakeholders to manage the humanitarian aid. A good case is the alleged mismanagement of aid for the Cyclone Idai response. The primary respondents stated that uniformed forces would take the aid during the night for resale claiming that they were not being paid for securing the aid items. Communities stated that they observed this trend and it was an "open secret" which they were not prepared to report due to the inadequacy of whistle-blower mechanisms.

### 5.3.3 Limited Access to Information

Humanitarian aid management standards encourage aid managers to give citizens access to key facts and data from the government and any public body. In both the Cyclone Idai and the Cholera Responses there were gaps in terms of information sharing on the humanitarian aid and social initiatives. Standard procedures such as sharing of registration information were not fully practiced in both responses. In spite of the poor aid management mechanisms put in place by the secondary stakeholders, the primary aid recipients shared among themselves information and identified corruption risks. A total of 77% of the score card ratings posited that they shared information among themselves. The communities would discuss among themselves incidences of corruption. The fear of reprisals forced the primary aid recipients to avoid reporting or discussing their concerns with secondary stakeholders.

It would have been prudent for government to coordinate and enforce standard guidelines. A demand to ensure that citizens (beneficiaries) had access to full information would have reduced corruption risks. Observations by the respondents reveal that access to registers for benefit, distribution lists, and post distribution reports among other key documents was never intentionally facilitated. It was argued by the respondents that a general trend in both responses was for the stakeholders managing the aid to unilaterally manage the aid. Thus it can be concluded that there was no intent to share the information with affected communities.

“

If election results were posted on the doors of a polling stations, what harm could the printing of registers, distribution lists and sharing reports have made to the response, instead the contrary is true"

*A young man FGD respondent from Glenview Area 2, Harare, Zimbabwe*

”

The lack of transparency in this regard fed into corruption vulnerabilities as argued by the primary beneficiaries of the Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses.

The registration process was marred by corruption as stated by respondents from all the 5 study sites. Registration was shrouded in secrecy, creating opportunities for double registration and double dipping when it came to receiving the aid. It also created opportunities for those distributing aid to manipulate the multiple entries of single households and collude with their accomplices and divert the aid for sale on the parallel market.

It was also argued especially in Glenview and Budiriro that the uncoordinated registrations, shrouded in secrecy as already alluded to above was a deliberate ploy by the Health Promoters to manipulate the system and divert aid. The registration process was done a multiple of times, by many different players and distribution was also done in the same fashion with secrecy being the modus operandi.

It is important to highlight that there were efforts at empowering communities through anticorruption "campaigns". These

were conducted by stakeholders, who were not distributing any aid. However, the anti-corruption campaigns proved futile as the knowledge and practices were not reinforced by the conduct of the aid distributors. The anti-corruption campaigns and aid management became two exclusive processes and the first had no much impact on the latter.

### 5.3.4 Clientelism in Aid Management

Clientelism defined by Transparency International as an unequal system of exchanging resources and favours based on an exploitative relationship between a wealthier and/or more powerful 'patron' and a less wealthy and weaker 'client'. Clientelism was rampant as established through Household Interviews and FGDs. In Harare, in both Glenview and Budiriro respondents asserted that clientelism was evident – this was more pronounced at clinics where distribution of medication was selective, exclusive and discriminatory and indicative of clientelism.

“

I went to the clinic, I was diagnosed and a prescription was written. I was told there was no medication. On the second day I went back to the clinic, the nurse who had prescribed the medication was surprised that I was not given the dosage on the first day. She rebuked her colleagues who intentionally had discriminated me from accessing the medication"

*Elderly female cholera survivor FGD respondent from Glenview Area 2, Harare, Zimbabwe.*

”



Image Source: Volunteer Medical Corps



Image Source: Privilege Musvanhiri

### 5.3.5 Political Corruption

Transparency International defines political corruption as manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth.

A total of 56% of the score card ratings stated that the type and origin of aid determined its vulnerability to corruption. This was more so for political corruption as asserted by the responses. Respondents stated that aid which came through the "district" leadership was prone to corruption and unfair distribution. However it must be stated that political corruption was not overt as stated by the respondents. Although opportunities for political corruption were high in both responses, it could have been subtly managed through proxies who served as "foot soldiers" for politically exposed persons. The case of community health promoters as mentioned by Budiro respondents is indicative of some level of political corruption.

### 5.3.6 Non Transparent Procurement Processes

Procurement processes are a critical element in the aid value chain management and are defined as a multi-step process of established procedures to acquire goods and services by any individual, company or organisation — from the initial needs assessment to the contract's award and service delivery. Information and transparency around procurement processes cannot be confined to a few select. Accountability demands that the aid recipients have a sound appreciation of the

procurement processes. It may not necessarily be everyone, but key proxies should know what is happening around procurement.

A total of 84% of the score card ratings asserted that the beneficiaries were not informed on any procurement issues. The respondents argued that the secrecy and non-disclosure of procurement details was an indicator of corrupt dealings. The assertion is that stakeholders seized every opportunity to deal corruptly and hence had to ensure details around procurement were not disclosed.

Zimbabweans responded overwhelmingly to the Cyclone Idai response's call for aid (Columbus Mavhunga 2019). It was a common sight to see aid being packaged and shipped to Chimanimani at every social convergence space across Zimbabwe. Churches and schools amongst others became aid collection centres. It was however not clear what mechanisms were put in place in the management of the donations collected from across the country through the church and other pipelines. It is also not clear what kind of mechanisms were put in place to track and manage aid from donation, packaging, positioning and distribution. According to primary responses, generally the various church related actors who were managing and distributing church sourced aid were not "expected" to be transparent and were "exempted" from accountability standards. In cases where church actors had records or some accountability mechanisms these were perceived to be "private property". Corruption vulnerabilities were thus increased along the various aid pipelines including the church sourced response pipelines.

It was also posited that the limited bedding and observation space at council clinics increased corruption risks. The space was either inside the formal clinic structure or in some make shift tent facilities. The “patrons” would influence the system to give their relatives or acquaintances decent bedding and space within the clinic or tent spaces. The “weaker” clients were at the mercy of the nursing and health staff and would most likely be in the worst conditions or facilities.

In Chimanimani it was strongly stated that uniformed forces used the aid to patronise women, especially sex workers. The communities argued that sex workers had a “straight ticket” to aid managed by the uniformed forces. It was however emphasized by the primary respondents that this was neither “systemic” nor peculiar to the whole Cyclone Idai response. The aid recipients exonerated the majority of the uniformed forces and argued that it was sporadic and peculiar to particular members of the uniformed forces who they say thrived on clientelism. A total of 46% of the score card ratings indicated that there was a gender dimension in the corruption risks. They argued that the sex worker uniformed forces axis motivated women and other stakeholders to connive with aid “managers” to gain favours. This increased corruption risks as it were.

Contrary to the above assertion was praise for the uniformed forces, the Zimbabwe National Army to be particular. The army in spite of the negative taints alluding to patronising sex workers and using aid to lure them was observed to have made significant attempts at fighting corruption. The scenario illustrated by the assertions above reveal a discorded phenomenon

which is dichotomous in its presentation. In essence it reveals the corruption vulnerabilities inherent in the model used for managing the Cyclone Idai response. The respondents asserted that corruption risks and vulnerabilities posed were prominent during the initial stages of the responses.

It was also posited by the primary respondents that the police was ineffective at fighting irregularities in aid management. There were signs of levels of apathy-indicative of complacency and acquiescence to corrupt activities as argued by the respondents for the Cyclone Idai response case. The respondents reiterated that behaviours of some members of the police brought about speculation that they were expectant of “reward” or bribes by corrupt stakeholders. This was echoed by the key informants and focus group discussion respondents in all the 3 study sites in Chimanimani. This observation was never mentioned, and no such assertion arose in the case of the Cholera Response in Harare.

“

The police were there and we expected them to monitor the process yet practices such as double dipping would happen right under their nose. The soldiers tried to manage and curb corruption but the challenge was that the local leaders would monopolize the processes and capitalize on the whole situation”

*Semi structured Household Interview respondents at a household at Machongwe, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”

### 5.3.7 Code of Conduct Violations

A code of conduct is defined by Transparency International as a statement of principles and values that establishes a set of expectations and standards on how an organisation, government body, company, affiliated group or individual will behave, including minimal levels of compliance and disciplinary actions for the organisation, its staff and volunteers.

Respondents postulated that "no one knew anything", "no one made an effort to appraise the primary aid beneficiaries on anything concerning the aid management". A total of 61% of the score card ratings indicate that the primary aid recipients in both responses were not informed on details of the aid management. The aid management code of conduct was grossly compromised across the board. The stakeholders involved in managing the aid did not make intentional efforts to inform the beneficiaries and citizens on aid management guiding principles.

Knowledge on expected standards by the primary beneficiaries could have triggered complaints and reporting of irregularities. This could have ultimately put a demand for an effective complaints and response mechanisms. It became very difficult for the communities to observe and report or whistle-blow. It can in this instance be argued that one cannot whistle-blow or complain if one is not aware of what constitute "right" or "wrong" in any social activity. Aid recipients were thus systematically disempowered, and, in the process, corruption risks, vulnerabilities and impact were propagated.

“

The challenge was that people would clearly identify serious code of conduct violations by the various aid handlers, the bad inconsistencies and corruption tendencies but there was no clearly defined structure to which these would be reported to or where we could write to for action"

*Male Key Informant, Risuti Valley, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”



It is however important to state that the study was not able to verify if the different aid pipelines including the church complied with the Civil Protection Act of 1989 (Chapter 10:06). The piece of law gives the civil protection officers authority to demand or direct any person to supply information relating to the existence and availability of any service, facility or things whatsoever which may be used for or in connection with civil protection and which is under the control or in the possession of such person. This facilitates accountability and enhances transparency in the process.

“

Church managed aid  
Aid managed by ZCC and EFZ affiliated churches and the local "mapostori" sects could have been managed in accordance to transparency and accountability standards. Thus exonerating the churches and religious institutions from corruption allegations. Communities perceived anything channeled through churches to be "private" and not open to public scrutiny. The ZCC and EFZ could have used its local institutions to empower and inform aid recipients to reduce corruption vulnerabilities. The value chain from mobilization, collection, shipping and distribution of aid was prone to corruption risks and was not publicly "interrogated"  
*Female Key Informant, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”



## Code of Conduct

Statement of principles and values that establishes a set of expectations and standards for how an organisation, government body, company, affiliated group or individual will behave, including minimal levels of compliance and disciplinary actions for the organisation, its staff and volunteers.

### 5.3.8 Conflict of Interests

Conflict of interest is defined as a situation where an individual or the entity for which they work, whether a government, business, media outlet or civil society organisation, is confronted with choosing between the duties and demands of their position and their own private interests.<sup>10</sup> To reduce corruption vulnerabilities organisations must establish policies and procedures to identify, monitor and manage conflicts of interest which may give rise to a risk of bribery – actual, potential or perceived.

In Budiriro it was strongly argued that the Community Health Promoters who the majority are elderly are all aligned to a certain political party. It was further argued that they could, therefore not have been in a position to separate their political interests from the demands of their role. Their role was therefore contaminated with toxic connections linked to their political affiliations. They could not be impartial in their actions as they responded to the cholera disaster, the aid recipients argued. This could however not be proved but the speculation still lingers in the perceptions of the community. The assertion is that the Community Health Promoters are mere proxies and linked to politically exposed persons (The Zimbabwean - *Politics Of Patronage And Relief Aid Frustrates* PYD). The politically exposed persons manipulated the proxies. The politically exposed persons ultimately influenced the management of the aid. It was also argued that politically exposed persons as a matter of strategy always dispense some patronage to their constituencies – influencing the distribution of the aid as it were. This argument was put forward

across all the five study sites but was more pronounced at the Harare study sites.

### 5.3.9 Ethics Breaches in Aid Management

The qualitative primary data revealed gross disregard of ethical conduct. 56% of the score card ratings pointed to ethics violations which was mostly manifest in general information and detail deprivation of aid recipients by the aid managers. For example in Budiriro and Glenview the stakeholders distributed the Cholera Response aid without formally informing and inviting the targeted beneficiaries. There was no intent to allow communities to apply standard participatory techniques to verify and validate registers and distribution lists. Beneficiaries stated that they raised concern around multiple registration of households but none of the aid managers acknowledged and no actions were taken to correct this. Further, there were no formal "spaces" to deliberate on such unethical conduct by stakeholders in pursuant of the "Do no harm" principles. Standard aid management guidelines were expected to have intentionally created "safe spaces" for complaints and response management. This gap increased suspicion by the receiving communities and fed into already existing corruption vulnerabilities. It can also be reiterated that the impact was negative especially on the vulnerable members of the communities. They had already been exposed to negative effects of the disaster and the cumulative vulnerabilities further weakened them.

10. Transparency International.



### 5.3.10 None Existence Of Whistleblowing Opportunities

Whistle-blowing can be defined as making a disclosure in the public interest by an employee, director or external person, in an attempt to reveal neglect or abuses within the activities of an organisation, government body or company (or one of its business partners) that threaten public interest, its integrity and reputation<sup>11</sup>. Companies and organisations should empower whistle-blowers who experience or witness bribery and corruption through effective whistle-blower policies and procedures.

It is common to observe some whistle-blowing information and suggestions in most NGOs offices. The study respondents observed that public spaces (schools, clinic and churches etc.) had no literature and bold statements and suggestions on how to whistle-blow. A total of 80% of the score card ratings indicated that there was a concerted effort at empowering aid recipients to whistle-blow. The communities were never intentionally empowered to be able to do whistle-blowing. Primary beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and social initiatives for both the Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses reiterated that there were no mechanisms in affected communities. It was posited that both primary aid recipients and secondary stakeholders leading and managing the aid were not empowered to whistle-blow.



## 6.0 Impact of Corruption on the Primary Aid Recipients



The study observed various types and level of impact of corruption on primary aid recipients. The impact included levels of Gender Based Violations, exclusion of vulnerable households, the elderly, PLWD and reinforcement of political tensions.

### 6.1 Reinforcing Latent Political Tension

The general impact of corruption on the aid and social initiative recipients for both responses was its reinforcement of existing salient political conflicts. The political divide which characterizes the Zimbabwean society – the ZANU PF and MDC divide which in many rural communities may be subtle played into the aid management as asserted by primary respondents of the study. The argument by the primary beneficiaries of both responses was that aid which came through the district leadership was exposed to corruption and also feed into the assertion that politics assumed a role in the management of the response. The district leadership was mostly civil servants and led by District Administrators (now District Development Coordinators). The District Administrators are appointees and one may be tempted to assume that they were dispensing patronage to those who appointed them. Observations were also that district leadership did not seek to assume an apolitical position. Slogans and regalia peculiar to political parties were observed among district leadership thus reinforcing their alignment to a particular political party.

“

Enmity grew within the community as a result of such corrupt tendencies. Grudges started and somehow are along political lines"  
*Adult male Key Informant, Machongwe, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”



## 6.2 Women Disproportionately Disadvantaged (Sexual Exploitation and Gender Based Violence)

It is important to mention that corruption in the case of Cyclone Idai and Cholera Responses affected both women and men while disproportionately affecting women, children and the elderly. Observations at a global level assert that women experience corruption in their daily lives particularly in their role as primary care givers (Rheinbay and Marie 2016). Women in both the two responses assumed care giver roles, attending to the sick, injured and seeking to provide the daily needs of their households. Women were exposed to sextortion especially in the Cyclone Idai Response. The observations reveal that women were then reduced to commodities and had to transact sex for goods and services in an effort to get immediate relief for their affected households. The study can thus conclude that to perpetuate the violations systematically the perpetrators may not have facilitated empowerment of women and ensured they maintained the power imbalances to their advantage. It can also be argued that corruption can be a barricade to women's full access to their basic rights and stifles their ascension into leadership positions in the process.<sup>12</sup>

The negative impact of corruption also assumed a gender dimension as elderly and vulnerable women were not in a position to demand service and support. The youthful and especially men and those "politically well connected" with socio-economic muscle would then benefit easily. The sex workers-soldiers toxic axis observed in some parts of Chimanimani also further exposed women to abuse. The women who corruptly benefited were

envied by other women (potential aid recipients) creating corruption risks and vulnerabilities and increasing sexual exploitation and abuse vulnerabilities in the process. The negative impact of the potential or actual sexual exploitation and violations would thus far outweigh the aid benefit they received. The primary data does not reveal any gender-based violence but it reveals levels of coercion and manipulation. It can thus be concluded that the vulnerabilities were cumulative for female, elderly, chronically sick person headed households. The vulnerability of the victims and survivors of sexual abuse, and the power of the abuser, create multiple interlocking barriers to reporting.<sup>13</sup> An intersection of gender, vulnerability, political power, resource endowment and age became manifest according to the primary respondents. This was so in both responses while vulnerabilities were more for the Cyclone Idai response.



12. [Transparency.org/news/eve](https://www.transparency.org/news/eve)

13. House of Commons International Development Committee Sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid sector Eighth Report 2017 -2019

“

The reality is that aid organisations are frequently operating in highly complex social contexts where the risk of abuse and exploitation may be exacerbated by cultural beliefs or where acute hardship means that individuals resort to risky behaviours simply to survive. These factors can have the mutually reinforcing impact of providing opportunities for perpetrators to exploit and abuse vulnerable individuals (for example where there is an increase in "survival sex" in the wake of a disaster) but also of reducing the likelihood that those affected will speak up, for fear of stigma or of exclusion from the support they depend on to survive. For instance, victims of sexual violence may suffer rejection by their own family or community and suffer long-term impacts that are as devastating as the attack themselves.'

*Sinead Magill – Managing Partner – Oct 25, 2019*

”

### 6.3 Increased Protection & Safeguarding Risks

Consumers of public services, patients and students in particular make serious attempts to access privileged care through paying bribes.<sup>14</sup>

“

A large proportion of Africans pay bribes to access "free" social services or to hasten access to services

*Report – Stolen Futures: The impact of corruption on children in Africa*

”

Bribery increases inequalities in access to essential services for children and reduces the quality of services offered. There is a strong argument that children bear a disproportionate burden of the discriminatory effects of corruption due to their reliance on public services and reduced capacity to challenge corrupt practices.<sup>15</sup> Systematically children were disproportionately affected in both responses – in the case of the Cholera

response, the bribing of nurses and health personnel to access drugs and hospitalization spaces exposed children whose families did not have the socio-economic muscle to challenge the corrupt actions. In the case of the Cyclone Idai response children were not part of the processes and were heavily reliant on their care givers, their mothers in most cases who also were being violated in a gross way.



14. <https://au.int/en/articles/stolen-futures>

15. The chairperson of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption

## 6.4 Exclusion of Persons with Disabilities

The processes and systems put in place were not disability inclusive. People living with disabilities are not a homogenous group. Disability intersects with a range of other individual, social, economic and cultural factors, leading to differing vulnerabilities and inequalities as posited by John Twigg et al (2018). Disability inclusion cannot be achieved without challenging the societal and institutional discrimination, marginalisation and exploitation experienced by people with disabilities in disasters and at other times. This can be facilitated with intentional efforts and actions by the various stakeholders and this was not so in the case of the two responses. The responses related activities and processes implicitly reinforced either existing or new manifestation of exclusion of person with disabilities.

“

In most cases, people with disabilities faced challenges to access aid because there was little priority for us. Eventually very few of us managed to get aid in time.  
*Adult female respondent, Ngangu, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe*

”



## 7.0 Recommendations

In light of the observations, corruption risks and vulnerabilities as highlighted in the study, TI Z makes the following recommendations which will mitigate against the vulnerabilities and corruption opportunities. Thus ensuring the targeted beneficiaries benefit from the targeted interventions

**Recommendation 1:** Registration, verification and registers for any aid or support must be done in a transparent way to ensure beneficiaries are informed and have access to the documents. Further verification must be done by the communities with support of other stakeholders.

**Recommendation 2:** Safeguarding and protection ethics and code of conduct must be cascaded to all levels, adhered to and monitored at all levels and by designated stakeholders who should include the benefitting communities and their constituencies.

**Recommendation 3:** Distributions of aid must be made public. Benefitting communities should be informed and mobilised adequately whenever aid is distributed.

**Recommendation 4:** Selection criteria from aid recipients must be fully explained and shared widely. A laid down criteria would serve the communities and aid managers' best.

**Recommendation 5:** The response mechanisms must be shared fully, that is its objectives, targets, processes and any other critical information so that stakeholders can be empowered to provide oversight and local management.

**Recommendation 6:** Consider the usage of online/virtual tracking systems, which can track movement of aid from source to distribution.

**Recommendation 7:** Involve primary recipients in procurement processes. It would be fair to involve them at all levels.

**Recommendation 8:** Train all stakeholders in aid management and standard guidelines across the spectrum.

**Recommendation 9:** Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Responses must liaise with Disability Persons Organisations for meaningful main streaming of disability inclusion.

**Recommendation 10:** Aid distribution to consider pre-position adequately to ensure that Disabled Persons are not disadvantaged or excluded in the process.

**Recommendation 11:** Create an Anti-Corruption task team or committees which include primary beneficiaries of aid or social initiatives.

**Recommendation 12:** Include Anti-Corruption in all Risks Assessments conducted in aid management or disaster responses.

## 8.0 Conclusion

The study can conclude that corruption risks and vulnerabilities were observable in both the Cyclone Idai and Cholera responses. The two responses were generally characterized by gross disregard of standard humanitarian aid management standards. The stakeholders were overwhelmed with need to respond and quickly alleviate suffering and avoid deaths of affected person. In the process expediency overtook ethics and standards opening opportunities for corruption.

Collusion was evident in both responses, the irregularities, uncoordinated registrations, double registrations and unclear mechanism created local cartels and opened opportunities for gross collusion. Access to key facts and data which is critical in aid management was not facilitated. The communities especially the primary aid recipients were deprived of critical facts and data around the aid and social initiatives. Clientism was observed especially in the Cyclone Idai where communities strongly assert that the uniformed forces used aid to gain sexual favours. It was also evident though to a lesser extent in Harare during the Cholera response where nurses would solicit for favours from cholera victim's relatives who needed hospitalisation.

An effective Complainants and Response mechanism is premised on information and knowledge of expected standards and processes. The primary beneficiaries of aid in both responses were never appraised of the accountability standards, ethics and any other code of conduct related information. The aid recipients were not empowered to be able to complain. Conflict of interest characterised the processes, where personalities were registering, verifying and distributing aid – they were managing the whole value chain without checks and balances. Political corruption was observable in both responses. There was some level manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure at local level.

Anti-corruption proponents suggest that procurement processes are a critical element in the aid value chain management. The benefiting community was never in the picture and it became the business of intervening agencies and other secondary actors. Whistle blowing which can assist in disclosure of irregularities was not promoted and communities were not empowered to utilise this effective tool. The corruption risks and vulnerabilities had a negative impact on the aid recipients and their communities. The impact can be summed up as – reinforcement of existing political tensions, women disproportionately disadvantaged, gender and sexual abuse and violence increased, increased child protection risks and vulnerabilities and negative economic effect on local economy.

- African Union. (2020) Stolen Futures: The impact of corruption on children in Africa. @ <https://au.int/en/articles/stolen-futures-impact-corruption-children-africa>
- Burney, S.M. (2008). Inductive & Deductive Research Approach. Department of Computer Science University of Karachi. @ <http://www.drburney.net/INDUCTIVE%20&%20DEDUCTIVE%20RESEARCH%20APPROACH%2006032008.pdf>
- Cebelihle Bhengu (27 March 2019). Zim artist slams Cyclone Idai aid: 'The donations don't reach the affected people.' Times Live. @ <https://www.timeslive.co.za/tshisa-live/tshisa-live/2019-03-27-zim-artist-slams-cyclone-idai-aid-the-donations-dont-reach-the-affected-people/>
- Columbus Mavhunga (19 March, 2019), Zimbabweans Unite to Ease Cyclone Idai's Effects. @ <https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabweans-unite-ease-cyclone-idais-effects>
- Daniel Maxwell, Peter Walker and Cheyanne Church. (2008) Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance. @ <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1836.pdf>
- Daniel Maxwell, Sarah Bailey, Paul Harvey, Peter Walker, Cheyanne Sharbatke - Church, Kevin Savage. (2011). Preventing corruption in humanitarian assistance: perceptions, gaps and challenges. @ <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2011.01245.x>
- GSDRC, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (UK). @ <https://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/international-legal-frameworks-for-humanitarian-action/concepts/humanitarian-principles-and-humanitarian-assistance/>
- Hart Elizabeth, (2019). Guide to using corruption measurements and analysis tools for development programming, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Transparency International, Chr. Michelsen Institute. @ <https://www.u4.no/publications/guide-to-using-corruption-measurements-and-analysis-tools-for-development-programming>
- House of Commons (2019). Sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid sector International Development Committee, Eighth Report 2017 -2019. @ <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UK%20Parliament%20Report%20July%202018.pdf>



Humanitarian Aid @ [https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Humanitarian\\_aid](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Humanitarian_aid)

Janna Rheinbay and Marie Chêne (2016). Gender and Corruption Topic Guide, Transparency International. @ [https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Topic\\_guide\\_gender\\_corruption\\_Final\\_2016.pdf](https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Topic_guide_gender_corruption_Final_2016.pdf)

John Twigg, Maria Kett and Emma Lovell. (2018). Disability inclusion and disaster risk reduction Overcoming barriers to progress, Evidence Ideas change. @ <https://www.odi.org/publications/11166-disability-inclusion-and-disaster-risk-reduction-overcoming-barriers-progress>

Lincoln Towindo in Chikomba, (31 March 2019). Cyclone Idai aid looters to face the music. The Sunday Mail, @ <https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/cyclone-aid-looters-to-face-the-music>

Luthando Mapepa and Ray Bande, (09 April 2019). Ministry official nabbed over Idai donations. The Herald, @ <https://www.herald.co.zw/ministry-official-nabbed-over-idai-donations/>

Mandla Ndlovu, (09 Apr 2019). Energy Mutodi speaks on Cyclone Idai looters. Bulawayo 24 News. @ <https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-160214.html>

Paul Harvey. (2015). Evidence on corruption and humanitarian aid, CHSAlliance. @ <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/evidence-corruption-and-humanitarian-aid>

Roslyn Hees, Stephanie Debere and Larissa Schuurman, (2010). Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations: Pocket Guide of Good Practices, Transparency International, International Secretariat Berlin, Germany. @ [https://www.rodekors.no/contentassets/cb5a6498440946c1a3ccd218b04f8be0/pocket-guide\\_corruption.pdf](https://www.rodekors.no/contentassets/cb5a6498440946c1a3ccd218b04f8be0/pocket-guide_corruption.pdf)

Sinead Magill | Palladium – (Oct 25 2019) Preventing Sexual Abuse in the Aid Sector Takes More than Company Policy. @ <https://thepalladiumgroup.com/news/Preventing-Sexual-Abuse-in-the-Aid-Sector-Takes-More-than-Company-Policy>

The Zimbabwean- Politics of Patronage and Relief Aid frustrates PYD (27 March 2019). @ <https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/politics-of-patronage-and-relief-aid-frustrates-pyd/>

Transparency international (2010). Pocket Guide of Good Practices: Preventing Corruption In Humanitarian Operations, Transparency International. @ [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/handbook\\_of\\_good\\_practices\\_preventing\\_corruption\\_in\\_humanitarian\\_operations](https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/handbook_of_good_practices_preventing_corruption_in_humanitarian_operations)

Transparency International Zimbabwe. @ <https://www.transparency.org/glossary/>

Transparency International Zimbabwe (2017). Mining Awards Corruption Risk Assessment Tool. @ [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/mining\\_awards\\_corruption\\_risk\\_assessment\\_tool](https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/mining_awards_corruption_risk_assessment_tool)

UNICEF, UNICEF's Global Social Protection Programme Framework (2019). @ <https://www.unicef.org/media/61026/file/UNICEF-social-protection-programme-framework-exec-summary.pdf>

New World Encyclopedia, Humanitarian Aid. @ [https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Humanitarian\\_aid](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Humanitarian_aid)









**TRANSPARENCY  
INTERNATIONAL  
ZIMBABWE**

the coalition against corruption

**HARARE OFFICE**

96 Central Avenue  
Harare, Zimbabwe  
Phone: +263-242-703246, 08677004072

**BULAWAYO OFFICE**

Suite 211, Masiye Pambili Business Centre  
Fort Ave, Btwn 8th/9th Avenue  
Bulawayo CBD  
Phone: +263-292-881397, 08677004073

**MUTARE OFFICE**

4 Carlos Flats  
Cnr D Avenue/4th Street Mutare  
Phone: +263-020-60030 08677004073

SUPPORTED BY:



**Sweden  
Sverige**

Connect with us on:

Transparency International Zimbabwe 

@TIZim\_info 

@transparencyintzim 

[www.tizim.org](http://www.tizim.org) 